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In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit 
markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in 
which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing 
possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts 
sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk 
categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast 
between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by 
specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the 
efficiency and equity of mortgage lending.  
This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences 
in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a 
perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same 
underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear 
and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section 
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then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on 
risk characteristics by the market.  
 
1. Introduction  
This paper is motivated by two stylized facts that distinguish the 
market for personal credit from the mortgage credit market. First, 
there are fundamental differences in the credit supply function 
between personal loan markets and mortgage markets. U.S. 
households face a continuous supply of personal credit from lenders. 
That is, individual lenders offer personal loans and revolving credit at 
rates that reflect the continuous distribution of consumer credit risk in 
the market. In contrast, mortgage credit is split into “prime” and 
“subprime” markets in which lenders specialize and the effective credit 
supply function is stepwise linear. The more or less continuous pricing 
of credit in personal loan markets contrasts with mortgage markets 
where price increases as a step function of credit risk. Within each step 
of these mortgage markets, there is substantial cross subsidy between 
the best and worst risks.  
For example, IndyMac Bank provides borrowers with a menu of 
risk classifications (level 1 through level 5) to choose from. Level 1, 
the least risky classification, charges a 1.875 percentage point 
premium over the quoted prime mortgage rate of 5.875. The interest 
rate premium for 30-year, fixed-rate owner-occupied mortgages 
increases to 2.25, 2.75, 3.875, and 5.125 percentage points for the 
subsequent levels 2 through 5.1 
A second stylized fact contrasting personal loan markets and 
mortgage markets concerns the relation between credit risk and 
rejection rates. In personal loan markets, rejection rates are higher for 
low-risk, low interest rate credit. In contrast, rejection rates in 
mortgage markets are much higher for subprime lenders than for 
prime lenders. For instance, the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) reports that the rejection rate for subprime 
mortgage applications was 33 percent while for prime applications, the 
rejection rate dropped to 9.1 percent (see Scheessele (2003)).2 Thus, 
in personal loan markets rejection rates vary inversely with interest 
rates and in mortgage markets rejection rates vary directly with 
interest rates.  
These differences in operation between personal credit and 
mortgage credit markets are likely sufficient to raise concerns about 
the role of subprime lending. Concerns have been heightened because, 
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based on simplistic and flawed Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
measures, the subprime market appears to be growing dramatically to 
almost 9 percent of the total mortgage market, 10.9 percent of 
refinances, and 4.9 percent of home purchase originations.  
In view of this concern, two natural questions arise. First, is 
there a reason to expect, a priori, that the separation of prime and 
subprime lenders and positive association between interest and 
rejection rates arise naturally in an efficient mortgage market? 
Second, does it appear that consumers are sorted into conventional A, 
FHA, and subprime mortgage categories based on characteristics that 
can be related to credit risk—(i.e., does the interaction of mortgage 
markets and borrowers look like risk-based pricing even if that pricing 
is based on a few discrete categories rather than a continuum)? In 
order to answer the first question, we formulate a simple competitive 
model of the mortgage market in which A lenders, which could include 
FHA and conventional lenders, are well established and ask when, if, 
and how B lenders can enter. Can B lenders successfully compete by 
offering a mortgage product that is very close to their A rivals or not? 
To answer the second question, we estimate a model of mortgage 
choice using a full set of applicant characteristics including credit 
score, which is likely to play a crucial role, to determine how well we 
can account for the separation of applicants into conventional A, FHA, 
and subprime mortgages.  
 
2. A model of underwriting cost, self-selection, 
and subprime mortgage credit supply  
We begin with a highly stylized statement of the lender’s 
problem in a world with only BA^ lenders who underwrite each 
applicant and reject all those identified as high risk. The determinants 
of mortgage credit supply are identified and, given that higher risks 
are rejected, credit rationing arises by assumption.3 Then we allow 
type “B” lenders who are willing to consider higher risks than the A 
lenders to enter the market. We determine the conditions under which 
these lenders are able to enter and earn normal profit. Specifically, we 
ask how closely they are able to compete with the A lenders, (i.e., can 
the Bs target borrowers with risks just greater than those targeted by 
the A lenders, or must entry occur at a discrete distance)? In previous 
work on consumer credit, Oreska (1983) demonstrates that a group of 
specialized lenders has an advantage over a general-purpose lender. 
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We find that, for plausible values of the parameters, and given 
substantial principal borrowed and underwriting costs in mortgage 
lending, entry occurs at discrete intervals and that the supply of credit 
to subprime borrowers is not continuous.  
 
2.1. A market with only type A lenders  
Assume that mortgage credit is provided by a large number of 
perfectly competitive, zero profit lenders operating under constant 
returns to scale, risk neutrality, and common information sets. These 
assumptions assure that our results do not arise from the technology 
of production or market organization. The mortgage contract is highly 
stylized. Loans are for one period with a balloon payment equal to one 
plus the interest rate due at the end of one period. For borrowers 
accepted in the A market, a payment of IA is due in one year. In cases 
of default, the entire payment of principal and interest is lost.  
Applicants are only differentiated by the default probability 
which equals Di for applicant i. Given that all loans are offered under 
the same terms, there is no possibility for negotiation between 
borrower and lender. In contrast to the reality of mortgage markets, 
loan terms are exogenous. Applicants know both Di and the probability 
of acceptance, αA, at A lenders. Di ranges from 0 to Δ, a constant value 
strictly less than one. Applicants are uniformly distributed on this 
interval. Without loss of generality, we can scale the number of 
applicants to equal 1. As noted above, the loan size is also set equal to 
unity and we further assume that there is no association between Di 
and loan size. Lenders gain information about the Di of an applicant by 
exerting underwriting effort. The cost of underwriting is constant for all 
applicants and equal to U, of which β is the fraction paid by the 
applicant in the form of an application fee, so that (1 - β)U is the cost 
borne by the lender for each applicant. We impose upon the model the 
stylized fact that application fees cover a fraction, far less than half, of 
average underwriting cost.  
Lenders have maximum acceptable default probability (D) equal 
to Θ for the A market. They accept all applicants whose Di, where i 
indicates the individual applicant, is estimated, after underwriting, to 
be less than or equal to Θ. For applicants with Di less than or equal to 
Θ acceptance is certain, α = 1, regardless of the amount of 
underwriting (there is no type II underwriting error). For those with Di 
strictly greater than Θ, the probability of acceptance in the A market is 
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given by αA = ΓΘ/Di, where Γ is a between zero and unity, and the 
maximum value of Di is Δ so that α is bounded from below by ΓΘ/Δ. 
Note this implies that, for a given U, the rejection rate rises with Di.  
Borrower self-selection is a crucial element of the model. Given 
that applicants know, Θ, αA (based on their knowledge of U), and ΙA, it 
could be that some high-risk applicants, (i.e., those with Di close to 
D), would not apply at A lenders. We ignore this possibility in this 
version of the model. But, when a new entrant, the B market lender, 
with a cutoff risk level φ strictly greater than Θ tries to enter the 
market, we assume that high-risk borrowers will be aware of the terms 
offered by this lender and self-select accordingly. In actual practice the 
rejection of qualified applicants is an issue of concern to lenders, but 
does not alter our fundamental results.  
It is useful to begin to solve the problem of a type A lender by 
writing the expected profit the firm receives from any individual 
applicant, i, as:  
 
(1) 
 
where αA is the acceptance probability; ΙA –Ι is the interest spread over 
cost on A mortgages; Di is expected default probability which is equal 
to expected loss because the loan amount is normalized to 1; and the 
final term is the portion of underwriting cost borne by the lender. Note 
that competition and constant returns drive πi to zero for the average 
loan, but not for every loan.  
Overall profit of the A lender, maximized at zero, is the integral 
over all applicants.  
 
(2) 
 
As shown in equation (2), it is useful to partition applicants into two 
groups. The first group includes applicants who are always accepted 
(Di ≤ Θ, α = 1) and the second group includes applicants who are 
accepted a fraction of the time depending on how much the 
underwriting standards are violated (Di > Θ, αA is a decreasing 
function of Di and increasing in Θ). This will prove very convenient 
throughout our analysis.  
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Substituting equation (1) into (2), solving for πA, taking definite 
integrals, evaluating, and collecting terms gives:  
 
(3) 
 
Solving for ΙA that yields normal profit to A lenders, we find: 
(4) 
 
Credit supply implied by equation (4) has an intuitive 
explanation. ΙA equals cost of capital plus a markup to cover two costs 
of A lending. The first term, which can be written 
, reflects expected credit losses due to 
default. The numerator is positive and increasing in Δ, and is also 
positive and increasing in Θ whenever Γ is less than 1/2. The 
denominator is also positive, recalling that Δ/Θ > 1 > Δ > Θ > 0 and 
increasing in Δ while the effect of Θ on the denominator is ambiguous. 
The second term simply reflects the cost burden of underwriting which 
depends on the fraction of all applicants accepted and hence should 
rise with Δ and fall with Θ. These two effects reveal the lender’s 
problem. Raising Θ has two opposite effects on costs. Increasing Θ 
raises expected default losses but it also lowers the fraction of 
applicants rejected and hence lowers the expected cost of underwriting 
applications.  
It is also instructive to consider what happens to ΙA if applicants 
self-select so that no one with Di > Θ applies. In this case, πA depends 
only on the integral of profit over the 0 to Θ interval and the second 
integral is dropped. The result is:  
 
(5) 
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The intuition of equation (5) is even more straightforward. Required 
interest is equal to cost of funds, Ι, plus average default loss  plus 
application cost when there are no rejections.  
 
2.2. Entrance of B lenders in the presence of incumbent 
A lenders  
As noted above, the B lender has the same constant returns to 
scale technology as lender A and entry by B lenders will drive their 
economic profit to zero, as it does in the A market. The only 
characteristic that differentiates a B lender from an A lender is the 
target risk level of applicants. B lenders will tolerate default risk of φ 
strictly greater than Θ. Applicants recognize this difference in lending 
standards, and all those DΙ with strictly greater than Θ will apply at B. 
This assumption is favorable to the entrant, implying that all applicants 
switch from A to B when they perceive a higher probability of rejection 
at A than B, regardless of the higher cost of borrowing. However, this 
is a justifiable assumption given that the goal here is to analyze credit 
supply by B under conditions most favorable to the entrant.4 We now 
proceed to characterize the nature of the credit supply by such lenders 
assuming that A lenders are passive.  
Analysis of B lenders begins by writing expected profit from 
applicant i as: 
(6) 
 
where αB is the acceptance probability; ΙB – Ι is the interest spread 
over cost on B mortgages; Di is expected default probability (which is 
again set equal to expected loss because the loan amount is 
normalized to 1); and the final term is the fraction of underwriting cost 
borne by the lender. Note that competition and constant returns drive 
to zero.  
The overall profit of the B lender, maximized at zero, is the 
integral over all applicants, who in this case range from Θ to Δ.  
 
(7) 
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As before, it is useful to partition applicants into two groups—
those who meet the underwriting requirements and those who do not. 
Those who meet the underwriting requirements are defined as: 0 < Θ 
< Di ≤ φ and α = 1. Those who violate the underwriting standards are 
defined as: Di > φ and αB is a decreasing function of Di and an 
increasing function of φ.  
Substituting equation (6) into (7), taking the definite integrals, 
evaluating, and collecting terms we have:  
 
(8) 
 
Solving for the value of IB that yields normal profit to B lenders, 
we find:  
 
(9) 
 
ΙB must cover the cost of funds Ι, the cost of expected default losses 
 , and the cost of 
underwriting {(Δ –Θ)(1 – β)U}/{φ[1 + Γ(ΙnΔ/φ)] – Θ} . Comparing 
the value ΙB implied by equation (9) when φ = Θ, with ΙA given by 
equation (4), we find that B lenders will not be able to attract low-risk 
applicants away from A lenders, because ΙA is strictly less than ΙB.  
Less intuitive is the effect of φ on the supply price of credit, ΙB, 
by B lenders. Note that, in the relevant range, the denominator of the 
expression involving default and underwriting costs is monotonically 
increasing in φ. The effect of φ on the numerator is ambiguous, but, 
simulation results shown in Figure 1 indicate that using plausible 
values of the parameters, over a significant range of Δ > φ > Θ that 
 < 0. Thus the supply price of credit from B lenders falls when those 
lenders adopt more lenient lending criteria! The reason for this 
counterintuitive result is that the increase in the cost of expected 
default losses as φ rises is overcome by the fall in the average 
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underwriting cost. Average underwriting cost falls as φ rises because 
the fraction of applicants accepted increases while total underwriting 
cost remains constant. Total underwriting cost is constant because all 
potential borrowers will apply regardless of the interest rate charged 
by the B lenders. This can be seen in Figure 2, which graphs the 
values of the average underwriting cost and the average default cost, 
as well as the total average cost of lending. Competition forces B 
lenders to set their credit limit, φ, at the point that minimizes the 
average cost of lending and the interest rate charged to borrowers.  
As long as  < 0, competitive forces will make B lenders 
continue to raise φ (i.e., lower underwriting criteria). This leads to our 
central result, B lenders will serve a market that is separated in credit 
risk from that served by A lenders by a significant gap in 
creditworthiness. We could extend this argument further and include a 
C lender with similar results. In such a model, the final market 
equilibrium would consist of a discrete number of credit alternatives 
separated by significant gaps in creditworthiness. Based on this 
argument, we conclude that the observed gap between prime and 
subprime lenders and the discrete nature of mortgage credit supply is 
not inconsistent with a perfectly competitive mortgage market.  
Furthermore, our results also generate the second stylized fact 
separating personal loan and mortgage lending. Rejection rates are an 
increasing function of credit risk in our model because the significant 
cost of rejection for mortgage credit, including both the borrower’s 
share of underwriting cost and transactions costs of failing to achieve 
financing, cause high-risk applicants to self-select away from prime 
lenders. The distinct separation of lenders into A and B categories 
facilitates this self-selection and leaves prime lenders with lower 
rejection rates.  
Why is there a contrast between mortgage credit and credit 
cards, which provide risk-based pricing more or less continuously? The 
credit limit on credit cards serves to limit risk and allows borrowers to 
establish creditworthiness while limiting potential loss. Such credit 
limits are not appropriate for mortgage lending and are particularly 
problematic for consumers who are often seeking cash-out refinancing.  
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3. Credit history, mortgage, and demographic 
data  
Table 1 provides descriptions, mean, minimum, maximum, and 
the standard deviation of each variable. Due to data availability, the 
data are limited to home purchase mortgages only and do not include 
refinances or cash-out refinances. The data in this study came from 
four sources. First is the F42 database of the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), which contains detailed loan information and 
household characteristics for FHA loans, but no credit history. Second 
is a real estate transaction database from Experian, which has detailed 
loan information and household identifiers (e.g., address of the 
property, amount of the loan, value of the property, loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio, and type of loan), but no information on household 
characteristics. It contains a census of conventional loans in each 
county covered by Experian. This database was built from property 
transfer records at the local level. The third source is the individual 
borrower’s credit history from Experian. This credit history was 
matched to FHA and conventional loans by name, Social Security 
number, and property address, with all identifying information 
subsequently deleted. The fourth source is HMDA data that were 
matched by loan amount, census tract, and lender identification to 
conventional Experian loans, to provide income and racial 
characteristics of households securing conventional loans.  
To separate the subprime and prime conventional loans, a list5 
of subprime lenders that report to HMDA created by the Office of 
Policy, Development, and Research (PD&R) in HUD (see Scheessele 
(1998)) was used. This list was created from trade publications; 
therefore, it may not include all subprime lenders that report to HMDA. 
In addition, not all subprime lenders report to HMDA. Finally, the list is 
unable to separate prime from subprime lending by HMDA reporters 
that traditionally originate both types of loans.  
The sample includes fixed-rate loans originated between 
February 1996 and July 1996, excluding loans for multifamily 
properties, refinancing, non-owner occupancy, and loans made to 
investors. The loans were matched by Experian to credit history files 
archived on March 31, 1996, by address, name, and Social Security 
number. This date was chosen to ensure that the credit data did not 
include information on the new mortgage, but were as current as 
possible. Observations with missing or obvious data coding errors were 
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excluded.6 A stratified sampling scheme varied sampling rates 
inversely with the FHA market share in each metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA). In subsequent statistical analysis, the effects of the 
sample stratification were offset by weighting each observation 
inversely to its sampling probability. Specifically, conventional loans 
were sampled at one-third of the FHA sampling rate.  
 
3.1. Down payment, income, and credit history  
Because FHA lending standards require very low down payments 
and even insure mortgages with negative equity once insurance 
premiums have been financed, we would expect mean FHA LTVs to be 
very high. Therefore, it is not surprising that Table 2 shows that the 
average down payment for subprime loans was 16.2 percent—well 
above the FHA average of 5.7 percent. In addition, prime borrowers 
have better payment-to-income ratios (PTIs) and Fair Isaac 
Corporation (FICO) credit scores. Note that subprime borrowers lie 
between FHA and prime borrowers, on average, in terms of LTV, PTI, 
and credit scores.  
While FHA serves borrowers who are wealth constrained, as 
shown in Table 2, the borrowers using subprime lenders appear to be 
more diverse and not as easily characterized. The answer might lie in 
the ability of the subprime lender to use discretion and unique lending 
programs that may not require that the borrower’s income be verified 
or that ignore the standard ratios (LTV or PTI) normally used in the 
underwriting process. Although a borrower who does not provide 
documentation supporting a steady income stream might not qualify 
for prime or FHA financing, this does not imply that the borrower has 
little wealth or a poor credit history.  
 
4. Econometric specification and results  
The choice model is estimated for a sample of 48,105 
households that purchased homes in 39 MSAs from February through 
July 1996. Because it can be argued that LTV and mortgage choice are 
jointly determined, LTV is estimated using instrumental variables. The 
predicted LTVs are then used to generate any variables that are 
affected by LTV.7  
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4.1. Specification  
The following specification, taken from Hendershott et al. (1997) 
and Gabriel and Rosenthal (1991), is used to estimate the conditional 
prime, FHA, subprime choice model:  
 
Cj = β0 + β1Fj + β2Θj + β3Dj + β4Lj + εj  (10) 
 
where Fj is a matrix of financial-monetary variables; Θj is a matrix of 
credit history variables; Dj is a matrix of demographic variables; Lj is a 
matrix of location-specific variables; and εj is a normally distributed 
error term. These matrixes are discussed in turn below, and Table 1 
provides summary statistics for each explanatory variable as well as a 
brief description and the sources of data.  
 
4.2. Financial-monetary variables  
One consideration for the homebuyer is the relative cost of the 
mortgage. We focus on the costs to the homebuyer that are derived 
from differences in mortgage insurance rates and interest rates. For 
each buyer, we construct the present discounted value of interest and 
mortgage insurance payments for each mortgage option. For mortgage 
insurance fees, we assume payments stop when equity reaches 20 
percent and that mortgage payments are made on time with no 
house-price appreciation. The borrower’s credit is graded using the 
system reported by the Sub-Prime Funding Corp.’s Underwriting 
Manual. We rely on credit history variables such as late payment rates 
on revolving, installment, and mortgage credit as well as indicators of 
judgments, liens, or bankruptcy. In this fashion, we estimate what the 
best available interest rate would be from a subprime lender. Using 
estimates of interest rate spreads generated by Wall Street firms (see 
Weicher (1997)) and the Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation 
survey of credit terms and interest rates (see Steinbach (1998)), rates 
are increased over prime rates by 200 basis points for B-rated 
borrowers, 300 basis points for C-rated borrowers, and 500 basis 
points for D-rated borrowers. Because we estimate that more than 95 
percent of FHA borrowers financed the upfront mortgage insurance 
premiums in 1996, we assume this is true for everyone when 
calculating the cost of an FHA-insured mortgage. To measure the 
relative cost of prime mortgage insurance versus FHA insurance 
(Pc/Pf), we create the ratio of the present discounted value of the 
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insurance fees. To measure the relative costs of FHA mortgage 
financing and subprime mortgage financing, we create a ratio of the 
discounted interest costs for FHA mortgage financing to the discounted 
interest costs of subprime mortgage financing (Pf/Ps). The specification 
uses these ratios to test the importance of relative prices in the 
mortgage choice framework.  
A measure of the permanent income (yj) of the individual is 
estimated from the cross section of homebuyers and follows the basic 
method used by Zorn (1993). A simple model of current income 
provides parameter estimates for age variables that are used to 
estimate a stream of income through the age 65. This stream is 
discounted at the rate of 7 percent and transformed into an annuity (a 
coupon bond) that matures when the individual is 65 years old. The 
annuity provides the estimated value of the individual’s permanent 
income.8  
The amount of debt (dj) is created from the credit history data 
and is defined as the sum of current revolving debt and non-real 
estate installment loans. It is expected that increases in the non-real 
estate debt burden will make it more difficult for borrowers to qualify 
for the lower cost mortgage.  
The value constraint (vj) indicates if the household can purchase 
the desired amount of housing or if the household is constrained by 
income and/or down payment constraints. In spirit, we follow the 
approach of Haurin (1991) and Hendershott et al. (1997).  
The utility maximizing amount of housing that a household 
would like to own, in the absence of any mortgage financing 
constraints, is determined by maximizing a utility function subject to a 
budget constraint. This ignores the income and wealth constraints 
imposed by lending standards. Following Pennington-Cross and Nichols 
(2000), to determine the unconstrained demand, we estimate a 
reduced-form, house-price equation over unconstrained homeowners, 
defined as households who purchase a home with down payments 
greater than or equal to 30 percent of the value of the home, PTIs of 
less than 20 percent, and FICO scores above 700. Using the estimated 
non-constrained coefficients, the desired house price is calculated for 
all remaining homeowners. If the estimated house price is greater than 
the actual house price, the homeowner is defined as value constrained 
(vj = 1)  
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4.3. Credit history variables  
A variety of credit measures are tested. The FICO score (fj), one 
of the more common aggregate credit measures available, is used as a 
summary variable in the analysis.  
Using Freddie Mac’s Gold Measure Worksheet, we create the 
following more detailed credit history variables:  
 
 anyj is 1 if the borrower has any delinquencies or derogatory 
information ever or if fewer than five credit lines have ever been 
open, otherwise anyj is 0;  
 revj is 1 if the borrower does not have a revolving credit line or 
if total revolving balance is greater than $500, otherwise revj is 
0;  
 fewj is 1 if the borrower has fewer than three credit lines open 
ever, otherwise fewj is 0;  
 delj is 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the borrower has respectively 0-10, 11-
15, 16-40, 41-60, or > 60 percent of credit lines ever 30 days 
delinquent or worse;  
 pubj is 1 if there are any public record items (e.g., bankruptcy) 
on the credit report, otherwise pubj is 0; and  
 inqj is the number of inquiries in the past six months divided by 
2.  
 
All of these variables have been designed so that positive values 
indicate worse credit history and are expected to increase the 
probability of selecting FHA or subprime financing.  
 
4.4. Demographic characteristic variables  
Demographic characteristics are represented by dummy 
variables indicating borrower race (African-American bj, Indian ij, Asian 
aj, Hispanic hj) and marital status (mj). A spatial segregation version of 
the Gini coefficient (gj) is also included to measure the extent of racial 
segregation in each MSA. A zero value indicates complete racial 
integration of the group, while a value of 100 indicates complete 
segregation of the racial group.  
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4.5. Location variables  
A variety of location variables are used to describe the type of 
market in which the loan was made. Variables used to describe the 
housing market include a dummy variable indicating that the purchase 
is made in an “underserved” census tract (unsj), as defined by HUD; 
the one-year percent change in Freddie Mac’s reported repeat sales, 
home-price index (Δpj); and the standard deviation of Δpj for the last 
10 years (σΔpj). Variables from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
reflect the condition of the local labor market and are the average 
unemployment rate (uj) for the last five years for the MSA and the 
change in the unemployment rate in the last year (Δuj). Other 
variables measuring area housing cost and the FHA loan limit include a 
dummy variable indicating whether HUD defined the MSA as a high-
cost area (hcj) and the ratio of FHA’s loan limit divided by DRI’s 
estimate of the median house price for the MSA (11/hpj). Indicators of 
increased risk associated with a location may increase the probability 
that a borrower will use FHA or subprime financing.  
 
4.6. Estimation  
Two sets of results are reported. Table 3 provides the estimated 
coefficients from the multinomial logit estimation and Table 4 provides 
the ordered logit results. The general specification is as follows:  
 
Cj = β0 + β1Fj + β2Θj + β3Dj + β4Lj + εj  (11) 
 
where Fj is a matrix of financial-monetary variables; Θj is a matrix of 
credit history variables; Dj is a matrix of demographic variables; Lj is a 
matrix of location-specific variables; and εj is a normally distributed 
error term as discussed above. For each of the estimation techniques 
(multinomial and ordered), two specifications are reported—one with 
the FICO score and the other with more detailed credit history.  
Table 4 shows that ordering is statistically valid (as indicated by 
the mu of index), but the multinomial approach has better explanatory 
power. The log of likelihood is provided as a relative goodness-of-fit 
measure, and t-statistics indicate the significance of each parameter 
estimate with critical values of approximately 1.95 and 1.65 for the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. Tables 5 and 6 provide 
estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables calculated at 
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their means. All results discussed refer to the multinomial specification 
with FICO scores, unless otherwise noted.  
Financial costs play an important and varied role in the choice of 
prime, FHA, and subprime mortgage financing. For instance, 
homebuyers who are value-constrained are more likely to use FHA 
than prime and subprime financing. Borrowers with higher permanent 
income are more likely to use prime financing, while borrowers 
carrying a lot of non-real estate debt are more likely to use FHA and 
subprime financing. But for all measures, the magnitude of the 
responses is always substantially higher for FHA and conventional 
choices. For instance, Figure 3 shows that as the amount of non-real 
estate debt increases from the mean of $10,842 to $48,000, the 
probability of selecting prime financing drops from 80 percent to 56 
percent, while the probability of selecting FHA increases from 18 
percent to 42 percent, and subprime decreases from 1.77 percent to 
1.50 percent.  
As the cost of conventional mortgage insurance increases 
relative to FHA mortgage insurance, borrowers tend to switch to FHA-
insured mortgages. This result is consistent for both the multinomial 
and ordered logit models. But the result is not so consistent for the 
relative cost of FHA and subprime lending.  
The ordered logit estimation finds the expected result that, as 
the interest cost of FHA financing increases relative to subprime, 
borrowers are more likely to use subprime financing and less likely to 
use FHA financing. But the multinomial estimates find the opposite 
result. In addition, when the full array of credit history indicators is 
included, the relative cost of FHA and subprime is no longer 
statistically significant. This may indicate measurement problems in 
the subprime price variation or that some households that use 
subprime lenders cannot respond to prices because they are being 
constrained by unobserved aspects of their credit history or other non-
price rationing mechanisms.  
While Figure 3 shows that the amount of non-real estate debt 
can more than double the probability of using FHA, the changes in 
credit score dwarf this effect. Figure 4 shows that a decrease in a 
borrower’s FICO score—from a mean of 693 to 406, the lowest 
recorded score—increases the probability of choosing FHA from 20 
percent to 68 percent. Over the same range, the probability of using 
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prime financing decreases from 78 percent to 28 percent, and 
increases for subprime—from 1.77 percent to 3.10 percent.  
The detailed credit history variables show that FHA is a more 
likely choice for borrowers with poor credit, no matter how their credit 
history is tarnished. In contrast, the impact of credit history is more 
varied on the use of subprime lending. Only two of the six indicators of 
credit history have the anticipated sign and significance. For instance, 
if the borrower has ever had any delinquencies the probability of using 
subprime decreases. But, the results for the FICO credit score and 
indicators of the level of delinquency and public record items are very 
similar for both FHA and subprime mortgage selection. In fact, 
borrowers who are more than 30 days late on 60 percent or more of 
their loans are more than twice as likely to use FHA or subprime 
financing, as compared with those who are at least 30 days delinquent 
on less than 10 percent of their loans.  
The borrower demographic results indicate that (even after 
controlling for borrower income, debt, and credit history), racial 
groups behave differently. For instance, African-Americans, Indians, 
and Hispanics are more likely to use FHA and subprime financing than 
Whites. In contrast, Asians are less likely to use FHA, but more likely 
to use subprime financing than Whites.  
Location plays a role in mortgage choice. In general, prime 
financing is more likely when house prices are increasing or when the 
unemployment rate is decreasing in the MSA. In contrast, while the 
choice of prime and FHA financing is unresponsive to the volatility of 
house prices ( ), the probability of choosing subprime financing 
increases from 1.77 percent to 2.9 percent when the volatility is 
increased from the mean of 2.3 percent to the maximum of 5.8 
percent.  
In locations considered high cost, the probability of choosing 
FHA is 6 percent higher. In addition, in areas where FHA sets the loan 
limit so that a large portion of the market is eligible for FHA 
mortgages, the probability of using FHA also increases. This is true 
despite the fact that this study includes only loans that are FHA eligible 
(i.e., loans under the FHA loan limit). These results support the 
hypothesis that, when the FHA market is defined as only the bottom 
part of the market, it may have difficulty generating enough business 
for lenders to overcome the fixed costs of learning and staying up with 
FHA programs and/or that it may be difficult to find homes that meet 
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FHA’s habitability requirements in the lowest priced portion of the 
market.  
 
5. Conclusions  
Unlike other forms of credit, such as credit cards, risk-based 
pricing has not provided a smooth continuum of mortgage costs. 
Instead, the mortgage market is segmented into discrete risk 
classifications. Furthermore, rejection rates vary directly with interest 
rates in the mortgage market and inversely in the personal loan 
market. The theoretical model in this paper demonstrates that the 
discrete levels of mortgage credit supply and the positive relationship 
between interest and rejection rates arise from a separating 
equilibrium in the mortgage market. This separation does not rely on 
technology (returns to scale) or market power, but the simple 
observation that processing an application through the underwriting 
process is costly, and is only partially covered by the application fee. 
When a subprime lender tries to locate too close (in credit risk space) 
to prime lenders, the application costs overwhelm credit losses to the 
point where it is less costly to lower credit standards and accept a 
higher proportion of applicants. Equilibrium requires that the subprime 
lender move a substantial distance from prime lenders, thus leading to 
a discrete and segmented mortgage market.  
The econometric results show that the use of prime, FHA, and 
subprime lending is related to indicators of creditworthiness. For 
instance, credit history plays an important role in the selection of 
prime, FHA, or subprime mortgage financing. Other measures of credit 
risk, such as income, non-real estate debt, and value constraints are 
also very important determinants of FHA use, but play a smaller role in 
determining the use of subprime financing.  
Sensitivity tests show that no one indicator can make subprime 
a likely choice for any household. For subprime to be a likely choice 
requires that all of a household’s risk indicators must be very negative. 
It also may be very difficult to identify the characteristics that make 
subprime lending a viable option to borrowers because not all 
underwriting criteria are captured in the estimation, and the sample of 
subprime loans is quite small. For instance, subprime lenders can 
make loans to people who do not want to document their income or 
source of down payment. But our results do indicate that a homebuyer 
is more likely to use subprime lending when risk indicators such as 
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credit history and location are worse. Future research on subprime 
loan choice would benefit if loans could be characterized based on the 
total cost borne by the applicant, or borrower, instead of a simple 
lender classification.  
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Notes  
1. Downloaded from Indymacbank.com on 11/19/02 for 30-year, fixed-rate 
owner-occupied mortgages.  
2. HUD creates a list of subprime specialists that is used to define loans as 
prime or subprime. These figures must be viewed with some 
skepticism because reporting to HMDA has changed over time 
(mortgage bankers especially) and acquisitions of subprime lenders by 
depositories in the 1990s transformed them into mortgage banking 
subsidiaries. These factors are likely to lead to an over-statement of 
subprime growth and make it very difficult to accurately measure the 
size of the subprime market. In addition, it is clear that the HMDA 
approach does not include all subprime loans. For instance, in 1995 
the Inside Mortgage Finance estimate of subprime market share, using 
the dollar value of loans, is almost 7 percentage points higher than the 
HMDA estimates in 1995. By 1998, this spread had decreased to just 
over one point. This may indicate changing reporting in HMDA, 
changing methodology by Inside Mortgage Finance, or the changing 
market structure of subprime lending.  
 
3. In this paper, risk is defined solely from the perspective of credit risk due 
to default. The value of a mortgage is determined by the expected 
cash flow from the instrument and variance of the expected cash flow. 
Therefore, prepayments of mortgages also affect the value of a 
mortgage whether the prepayment is due to changes in interest rates 
or other mobility issues. See Pennington-Cross (2003) for a discussion 
of the prepayment characteristics of subprime mortgages.  
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4. There are typically two sets of underwriting costs. The first set of costs, 
which has fairly low marginal costs, includes the costs of automated 
underwriting. The second set of costs, which is labor and time 
intensive, is the process of verifying income, assets, employment, and 
the physical state of the property.  
5. Office of Policy, Development, and Research (PD&R) in the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  
6. Incomplete data was defined as having missing values for one or more of 
the key variables used in the analysis: mortgage amount; property 
value; date of closing for the mortgage; interest rate; term of the 
mortgage; indicator for a first-time home buyer; purpose of the loan; 
and the name, Social Security number, income, and assets of the 
borrower. Some variables were not missing data, but instead 
contained data entry errors (e.g., LTVs greater than 300 percent or 
income of $20). The following set of conditions was used to identify 
any observations containing obvious data errors: FICO scores greater 
than 850 or less than 360; LTV greater than 110 percent or less than 
20 percent; annual income of borrower greater than $1,000,000 or 
less than $1,000; age of borrower less than 18; and a loan amount 
less than $5,000.  
7. See Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) for details of the estimation 
technique.  
8. Since we do not have data on assets, income is estimated up to retirement 
age or 65 years of age and it is assumed that there is no par or face 
value payment at term (i.e., no retirement savings). A log-log form is 
used. See Pennington-Cross and Nichols for more details.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1. Matching experian real estate transaction to HMDA data  
Two key variables—race and income of borrower—were added to the 
Experian non-FHA home-purchase information by finding the corresponding 
mortgages in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database.  
The Experian database includes all non-FHA home-purchase mortgages 
made during the months of February 1996 through July 1996. HMDA and 
Experian use different sets of lender codes, so a crosswalk of HMDA and 
Experian lender codes is created. Lender codes (HMDA and Experian) were 
considered to be equivalent for a pair of lenders when, at least five times in a 
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single county, a single loan in the Experian file for a given lender code and a 
single loan in the HMDA file for a given lender code had the same loan 
amount within the same census tract. After this process, Experian loans that 
had multiple matches with HMDA were visually inspected (sorted by ZIP Code 
of lender and name of lender) to identify loans with the equivalent lender 
names. This crosswalk between HMDA and Experian lender codes was then 
used to match HMDA and Experian loan records. A loan was considered 
matched if it was the only loan that had the same loan amount and the same 
lender within a census tract. 
 
Appendix 2. Calculation of user cost measure  
The user cost of ownership is defined as follows:  
 
(12) 
 
where ty is the marginal income tax rate; r is the nominal mortgage rate (FHA 
rate is available on sample records and national average for the month of 
origination is used for conventional loans); tp is the marginal property tax 
rate; πe is the expected inflation in housing prices which is assumed to be 
myopic; δ is the economic depreciation rate which is defined as g * d; g is the 
structure-land ratio which is assumed to be 0.83; d is the depreciation rate, 
which is assumed to be 0.017 following Linneman and Wachter (1989); and s, 
m, and j indicate that the variable is geographically defined at the state, MSA, 
and individual level, respectively.  
For FHA borrowers, the marginal income tax rate (ty) is estimated 
based on the characteristics of each individual. Each borrower is assigned to 
one of three filing status categories—married, single, or head of household. 
All married persons are assumed to file jointly; non-married persons with 
dependents are assumed to file as head of household; and non-married 
persons with no dependents are assumed to file as single. Income levels are 
reduced by the deductions allowed by filing status, number of dependents, 
mortgage interest payments, and the estimated amount of state taxes paid. 
State taxes are based on the same information as federal taxes and the tax 
schedule of the state of residence. Total itemized deductions are defined as 
the sum of the interest rate deduction and state taxes. The federal taxable 
income is calculated using the minimum of itemized or standard deductions. 
In addition, a deduction of $10,000 is applied to all retirees (age greater than 
or equal to 65) to account for the non-taxable portion of Social Security 
benefits. Once the total federal taxable income is defined, the marginal tax 
rate is calculated using the appropriate schedule for the filing status of the 
borrower.  
To estimate the marginal income tax rate of individuals buying non-
FHA homes, we use the Current Population Survey (CPS)-reported federal tax 
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rate average by income class groups for homeowners. Property tax rates ( ) 
are created at the state level for the last year available (1994), using state 
and local property tax revenues and estimates of the total valuation of 
property:  
 
(13) 
 
where Ts is the property tax revenue for the state and local governments; KHs 
is the number of existing houses; PHs is the median price of existing homes; 
and s is the state. Data on tax revenue are collected by DRI and are available 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Government 
Finances. The number of existing homes is collected from DRI and is available 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Median house 
prices were estimated by DRI and are derived from the Federal Housing 
Finance Board Mortgage Interest Rate Survey and median prices released by 
the National Association of Realtors. 
 
Figure 1: Market Segmentation 
 
The following parameters are used to create the stimulations in Figure 1 and 2: Δ = 
0.2; Θ = 0.05; Γ = 1; b = 0.2; U = 0.05; and Ι = 1.05. 
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Figure 2: Average Cost Curves 
 
The following parameters are used to create the stimulations in Figure 1 and 2: Δ = 
0.2; Θ = 0.05; Γ = 1; b = 0.2; U = 0.05; and Ι = 1.05. 
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Figure 3: Mortgage Choice and Non-real Estate Debt 
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Figure 4: Mortgage Choice and FICO Score 
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Table 1: Data Description 
 
Notes: Explanation of Source: 1 = loan level data from the Experian transaction 
database as matched to HMDA and FHA’s F42 database; 2 = Experian credit history 
reports; 3 = United States Census Bureau; 4 = general HUD sources; 5 = Freddie 
Mac; 6 = United States Bureau of Labor Statistics; 7 = Standard and Poor’s DRI; a 
Value derived from auxiliary regression results. 
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Table 2: Mean Ratios and Scores by Mortgage Choice 
 
 
 
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model of Mortgage Choice 
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Table 4: Ordered Logit Model of Mortgage Choice 
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Table 5: Marginal Probabilities: Specification I 
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Table 6: Marginal Probabilities: Specification II 
 
 
 
 
 
